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ARGUMENT 
In responding to Guardian Title Company of Utah's (Guardian) appeal, Tebbs & 
Smith, P.C. (Tebbs), has essentially made three arguments in support of the trial court's 
decision: (1) Guardian's Complaint alleges only tort claims and not contract claims; (2) 
Tebbs was entitled to summary judgment because Guardian allegedly caused some of its own 
damages; and (3) all of Guardian's claims are barred because Tebbs' employee, Stacey 
Mitchell, was acting outside of the scope of her employment. Each of these arguments will 
be addressed in turn. 
I. GUARDIAN ALLEGED CONTRACT CLAIMS 
Tebbs does not dispute that there was a contract between Tebbs and Guardian nor 
does it apparently dispute that a cause of action for breach of contract for professional 
services exists in Utah. Rather, it asserts that Guardian has not alleged a contract cause of 
action. It proffers two reasons to support its premise. First it contends there can be no cause 
of action in contract because there was no explicit "provision that a Tebbs' employee would 
not write checks to herself or that Tebbs would indemnify Guardian for the criminal acts of 
an employee." (Brief of Appellee 6.) Secondly, it asserts that Guardian's claims that Tebbs 
breached implied covenants are in actuality disguised tort claims. 
It is true that there is no record evidence that Tebbs and Guardian expressly agreed 
that Tebbs' employees would not write checks to themselves. However, as discussed at 
length in the Appellant's Brief, Guardian has alleged that Tebbs entered into a verbal 
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agreement with Guardian to provide and perform professional public accounting services, 
including preparation of checks made payable to Guardian's employees and drawn on 
Guardian's bank checking account (Payroll Account) and the performance of account 
statement reconciliation services with regard to the Payroll Account. These facts are 
undisputed and admitted. (See R. at 3, 37, 182-83, 210.) A necessary implication of these 
contractual terms is that Tebbs was to provide those services for which the parties contracted. 
Thus, when Tebbs agreed that it would prepare checks made payable to Guardian's 
employees, the agreement contemplated that Tebbs would perform those services and write 
such checks exclusively to Guardian employees and not to any other person. In writing 
checks to a Tebbs employee, Tebbs has breached the express terms of the contract. 
Even had Tebbs' actions not violated an express term of the contract, they certainly 
violated implied terms. In its brief, Tebbs argues, as it did below, that any claim for breach 
of an implied or constructive covenant, particularly the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, is a claim for a breach of a duty imposed by law. (See Brief of Appellee 8.) The 
primary problem with this argument is that the argument misstates the law clearly established 
by this Court. 
The case law on this point is very clear. If a wrongdoer's obligation "to refrain from" 
doing a particular act "depend[s] upon any express or implied promise arising from the . . 
. contract," a breach of that obligation gives rise to a cause of action in contract. Peterson 
v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280, 1284 (Utah 1992) (emphasis added). If, however, the 
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wrongdoer's obligation to refrain from doing a particular act arises from "'a legal duty 
independently imposed as a result of what the [wrongdoer] undertook to do with relation to 
the plaintiffs interest,'" a breach of that obligation gives rise to a cause of action in tort. 
DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433, 437 (Utah 1983) (quoting Carl S. Hawkins, 
Retaining Traditional Tort Liability in the Nonmedical Professions, 1981 B.Y.U.L.Rev. 33, 
36). Accordingly, if the breach is of an implied promise arising from the contract, it is a 
breach of a contractual duty. 
Additionally, this Court has unambiguously held that a breach of the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing "'is read into contracts in order to protect the express covenants or 
promises of the contract, not to protect some general public policy interest not directly tied 
to the contract's purpose.'" Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280, 1284 (Utah 1992) 
(quoting Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 394 (Cal. 1988)); see also Beck v. 
Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 800 (Utah 1985). Hence, this Court has expressly 
concluded that "a violation of th[e] duty [of good faith and fair dealing] gives rise to a claim 
for breach of contract" Beck, 701 P.2d at 798 (emphasis added); see also St. Benedict's 
Dev. Co v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194, 200 (Utah 1991).1 
1
 Tebbs claims that Guardian did not properly plead a breach of the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. (See Brief of Appellee 14.) Of course, the only requirements of a 
complaint are that it contain a "short plain statement... showing that the pleader is entitled 
to relief and "a demand for judgment for the relief." Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a). In fact, 
a complaint is required only to " . . . give the opposing party fair notice of the 
nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type 
of litigation involved." It may also frequently be found stated in these cases 
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Despite these clear holdings, with nothing more than highly selective quotations from 
two cases, Tebbs conjures a new legal theory from its cauldron of equivocation. Citing the 
"growing out o f language of DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 1983), 
and the inapposite holding regarding the public policy exception to the employment at-will 
doctrine in the Peterson case, (see Brief of Appellee 8-9), Tebbs proposes a new and 
unsupportable theory: if a court has, as a matter of law, recognized an implied duty in a 
contract, a breach of that duty necessarily gives rise to a claim in tort. As explained fully in 
the Appellant's Brief and briefly above, the rule in Utah is expressly contrary to any such 
theory. 
Finally, without any analysis, Tebbs reiterates its argument that Guardian's Complaint 
actually is a disguised tort claim. (See Brief of Appellee 11.) However, this argument 
demonstrates Tebbs misunderstanding of the Complaint and the facts. Guardian has alleged 
that (1) when Tebbs failed to pay only Guardian's employees, it failed to fulfill the terms of 
its contract with Guardian, and (2) when Tebbs failed to disclose that it had written and paid 
that a complaint does not fail to state a claim unless " . . . it appears to a 
certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts 
which could be proved in support of the claim." 
Blackham v. Snelgrove, 3 Utah 2d 157,280 P.2d 453,455 (1955). Even a cursory review of 
the Complaint makes clear that Guardian has alleged the facts necessary to raise the claim. 
Specifically, the Complaint states that Tebbs "expressly and implicitly covenanted and 
agreed that it would charge and commission the performance of. . . services and duties by 
such of its employees as would perform the same accurately, properly, competently and with 
honesty and fidelity." (R. at 3, f^ 11.) This reference to an implied covenant to perform 
"properly" and "with honesty and fidelity" is certainly sufficient to plead a claim for breach 
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
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unauthorized checks, it failed to fulfill the terms of its contract with Guardian. Guardian 
does not allege that Tebbs' level of practice fell below a standard of care because it gave 
Guardian bad accounting advise or it failed to supervise its employees or it failed to follow 
certain accounting standards. Guardian alleges only that it had a contract with Tebbs to 
perform certain acts, and Tebbs did not perform those acts or did not perform those acts in 
good faith. See, e.g., Clark v. Milam, 847 F. Supp. 409, 420-21 (S.D. W. Va. 1994). Such 
a claim is a breach of contract claim. See Dan L. Goldwasser & M. Thomas Arnold, 
Accountants' Liability § 3.2, at 3-11, 3-13 (1996) ("Accountants may be held liable for 
breach of contract where they fail to perform a specific service which they are committed by 
contract to perform;" and "an accountant may be held liable for failing to perform contractual 
obligations in a satisfactory manner."); cf. Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal 
Malpractice § 8.8 (1996) ("The client may instruct the attorney to perform certain tasks or 
to act in a specified manner. The undertaking then becomes contractual in nature, and the 
failure to perform can result in virtual strict liability for any resulting injury.") 
II. THE QUESTION OF CAUSATION IS A DISPUTED ISSUE OF FACT 
Tebbs next argues that "the trial court concluded, as a matter of law,. . . that Guardian 
could not establish the requisite causation." (Brief of Appellee 6.) In support of this theory, 
Tebbs, citing Steiner Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins, 2000 UT 21,996 P.2d 531, and Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-27-38, argues that to determine whether Guardian can prove the requisite "thread 
of causation" requiring recovery from Tebbs, "the Court should take into consideration 
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Guardian's own role in causing the loss." (Brief of Appellee 10-12.) Each of the citations 
relied upon by Tebbs refers to apportionment of fault in a comparative negligence case. 
Obviously then, although the argument Tebbs has made is couched as a "causation" 
argument, it is really a mitigation/comparative negligence argument. 
The most obvious flaw in this argument is that, even if the trial court had concluded 
that Tebbs was entitled to summary judgment based upon its causation argument, such a 
conclusion would be incorrect as a matter of law.2 What Tebbs fails to recognize is that 
whether the plaintiff failed to mitigate is a factual issue which Tebbs bears "the burden of 
proving." John Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City Corp., 795 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). Viewing all evidence in a light most favorable to Guardian, there is at least a factual 
issue as to whether Guardian was required to mitigate, and, if so, how much the damages 
should be reduced. Further, Tebbs cites no authority that given the facts at issue, Tebbs 
would entitle it to summary judgment. 
The facts are simple. Guardian hired Tebbs to do its payroll accounting work, 
including reconciliation and preparing and filing the taxes. {See R. at 388.) Guardian paid 
Tebbs to do this work. Tebbs had all of Guardian's relevant bank statements, cash 
disbursement, and bank draft journals. {See id. at 385, 392-93.) Because of the contract, 
Tebbs had the best and only realistic opportunity to discover its breach. However, even 
2
 Another problem with the argument is that the trial court never explicitly ruled that 
it was granting summary judgment on the basis of the causation argument. {See R. at 464, 
33-34.) 
122998 GU006 010 & 
Tebbs did not discover Mitchell's activity. (See id. at 386.) If Tebbs, who had all of the 
records and relevant documents in its possession and who supervised Mitchell's work, did 
not discover the activity, it strains common sense to urge that Guardian should have, as a 
matter of law, discovered it sooner. 
Tebbs has also implicitly argued that Guardian's claim is barred by the doctrine of 
comparative negligence. Comparative negligence applies only to a negligence claim. See, 
e.g., Steiner Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins, 2000 UT 21, f4, 996 P.2d 531. In this case, 
Guardian has not urged a negligence claim but a breach of contract claim. Even if this were 
a negligence cause of action, however, the question of whether an entity is comparatively 
negligent is also a question of fact for which Tebbs would bear the burden of proof. See 
Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d 530, 531 (Utah 1979). As discussed above, the trial court did not, 
and, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Guardian, could not grant summary 
judgment on the evidence in this case. Genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the 
actions of Guardian. Again, summary judgment was inappropriately granted.3 
3
 Tebbs has cited law relating to a bank customer's duty to examine statements and 
checks for forgery in support of its position that the court can examine the reasonableness 
of a party's action in preventing fraud. {See Brief of Appellee 18-19.) There are several 
problems with this argument. 
First, none of the law cited by Tebbs states that the mere presentation alone of 
evidence of some negligence by a party who was the victim of a fraudulent act entitles the 
party presenting the evidence to summary judgment. As described above, there is a 
substantial factual dispute as to whether Guardian's conduct contributed to its damages, and, 
even if it did, how much of its conduct could be attributed to its damages. 
Second, these authorities are factually inapposite to this case. The law cited by Tebbs 
relates to a person's obligation to discover a bank's payment to a third-party who had 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE TORT DOCTRINE THAT 
AN EMPLOYER IS NOT LIABLE IN RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR FOR THE ILLEGAL ACT OF 
AN EMPLOYEE IS AN ABSOLUTE DEFENSE TO A BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION 
AGAINST THE EMPLOYER 
Finally, Tebbs argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because, although it 
agrees "that principals are bound by the acts of their agents," "illegal acts by an employee, 
for the sole benefit and purpose of the employee and not the employer,... are not within the 
actual or apparent scope of authority." (Brief of Appellee 20.) Accordingly, Tebbs argues, 
it could not "be liable for such illegal acts." (Id.) 
The trial court's conclusion and Tebbs arguments are based upon an incorrect 
understanding of the law and Guardian's arguments. Guardian's sole contention is that 
Tebbs breached the terms of its contract with Guardian when it failed to pay only Guardian 
employees and when it failed to reconcile bank statements. Thus, the question before the 
trial court was fairly straightforward: Did Tebbs breach its contract by failing to pay only 
Guardian employees and failing to reconcile bank statements? As discussed fully in the 
Appellant's Brief, the resolution of that question does not depend on the reason for the 
negotiated a check with an unauthorized signature or had negotiated an altered check. If the 
bank's employee had improperly debited a customer's account or the bank paid money in 
violation of its contract with the depositor, it would have liability. 
A bank is under the duty to disburse funds in accordance with the directions 
of its depositor. It is implicit in the Uniform Commercial Code that a bank 
may not charge its customer for any item not properly payable against the 
customer's account. 
10 Am. Jur.2d, Banks & Financial Institutions § 890 (1997) (footnotes omitted). 
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breach, only that a breach occurred. Further, the tort doctrine of respondeat superior does 
not apply in a contract claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Tebbs' position, reduced to its essential core, is that although Tebbs hired an 
employee that wrongfully converted money from its client, Tebbs has no liability for that 
conduct even though it thereby breached its contract with the client. Such a result is 
obviously contrary to the law and common sense. 
The trial court incorrectly concluded that Utah law requires that any action brought 
against a professional accounting firm must be treated in all respects as a negligence cause 
of action. The trial court also incorrectly concluded that an action for the breach of an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is one sounding in tort. Moreover, the trial 
court incorrectly concluded that Guardian attempted to use the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing to add new, independent terms to the contract. Finally, the trial court incorrectly 
concluded that Tebbs was not liable in breach of contract for breaches of contract caused by 
an illegal act committed by an employee. 
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Accordingly, Guardian respectfully requests this Court to reverse the order granting 
summary judgment to Tebbs and remand the case for trial. 
DATED this 1"T day of September, 2001. 
& SENIOR 
Jary A. Weston 
I). Scott Crook 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Guardian Title Company 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this IS day of September, 2001,1 did cause two true 
and correct copies of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF to be mailed, United 
States mails, postage prepaid, addressed to the following: 
Douglas T. Hall, Esq. 
4885 South 900 East, Suite 208 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117-5793 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee Tebbs & Smith 
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